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Introduction
The US has had a particularly troublesome relationship with Somalia since
the downfall of dictator Siad Barre in 1991.  Critics maintain that Washington’s
difficulties have stemmed from major miscalculations that reflected a funda-
mental misunderstanding of Somali society and history.
America’s first Somalia problem emerged after then US President George
Bush’s announcement on 4 December 1992 that he had ordered the deployment
of some 30,000 troops to Somalia.  He said they would be doing “God’s work”
by delivering food aid to starving Somalis and by preparing the way for a United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to keep the assistance moving.  However,
many Somalis perceived the US-UN intervention as an opportunity to acquire
political legitimacy or economic benefits.  Others believed the presence of for-
eign troops violated their country’s sovereignty.  
Washington’s crusade ended in disaster.  On 3 October 1993, some 115 US
troops launched a mission to capture Somali leaders who supported warlord
General Mohammed Farah Aideed.  The operation went terribly wrong as US
commanders had underestimated the capabilities of Somali forces.  Somali gun-
men killed 18 US soldiers, wounded 78 others, and shot down two Blackhawk
helicopters.  American forces retaliated by killing more than 1,000 Somali men,
women, and children during a battle that is now known as Africa’s My Lai.  In
other actions, Canadian, Belgian, and Italian troops committed an array of human
rights violations.  Washington refused to investigate the incident or to punish the
perpetrators but Canada, Belgium, and Italy underwent the painful process of
holding official inquiries into the excesses of their troops in Somalia and taking
steps to prevent their troops from carrying out future abuses.  
After the withdrawal of US forces (March 1994) and of UN peacekeeping
troops (March 1995), the international community largely ignored Somalia,
which had gained the reputation of a failed state.  However, the country contin-
ued to receive some humanitarian aid and support for an array of Somali peace
talks, none of which produced any lasting results and reinforced Western per-
ceptions that Somalia was one of Africa’s most dangerous and unstable countries.   
America’s second Somalia problem surfaced in the aftermath of the terror-
ist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 when Osama bin
Laden claimed that he had helped train the Somalis who had participated in the
1993 Mogadishu fire-fight thus helping to ensure that Somalia would be high on
the US target list.  Military and security planners believed that al-Qaeda terror-
ists fleeing from Afghanistan planned to reestablish themselves in Somalia.  As
a result, Somalia became a major focus of Washington’s Global War on
Terrorism.  On 12 December 2002, President George W. Bush readied the US
military for battle with al-Qaeda terrorists by authorizing the establishment of
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the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). 
Frustratingly, there was no outpouring of terrorists from Afghanistan to
Somalia.  Nevertheless, the search for al-Qaeda continued for more than a year.
Meanwhile, the US largely ignored the al-Qaeda operatives, who had been in
other East African countries such as Kenya and Tanzania for many years.  A 2003
UN Report of the Panel of Experts in Somalia showed that, while the US was
busily looking for non-existent al-Qaeda terrorists from Afghanistan in Somalia,
al-Qaeda operatives in Kenya had been planning an attack in that country since
at least 2001.  The report also indicated that the SA-7B missiles used in the 28
November 2002 attack on Mombasa’s Paradise Hotel and the attempted shoot
down of an Israeli airliner had been shipped thorough Somalia.  
In the aftermath of the Mombasa attack – which claimed the lives of 12
Kenyans, three Israelis, and at least two suicide bombers – most American poli-
cymakers finally realized that East Africa’s terrorist problem extended far
beyond Somalia.  Nevertheless, there still is a minority who continue to believe
that Somalia is al-Qaeda’s East African nerve center. 
The four Somali watchers who have contributed to this issue help to clari-
fy the political and military intricacies of contemporary Somalia and the role of
terrorism in East Africa.  The authors also explain why Somalia never became a
haven for al-Qaeda, the factors that contributed to the failure of numerous peace
initiatives, and the role of Islam in Somalia.  
Their findings suggest that Somalia remains a poor and divided country
that poses little threat to the West or to its immediate neighbors.  However, the
country’s role as a transit point for weapons and a safe haven for a limited num-
ber of Kenyan Somalis who are associated with al-Qaeda remains a piece of a
much larger and very dangerous puzzle. 
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